The Arrival of Critical Historicism by Gordon, Robert W.
Foreword: The Arrival of Critical
Historicism
Robert W. Gordon*
This Symposium registers a significant event: the recognition of "critical
history" as a category of intellectual practice relevant to law, an accredited
envoy from Other Genres to the City of Law.
Why is this news? After all, lawyers have recognized history for centuries
and put it to work in argument, justification, and rationalization. Most of the
ways in which lawyers use history are, however, not "critical" in any plausible
sense of the term. For lawyers the past is primarily a source of authority-if
we interpret it correctly, it will tell us how to conduct ourselves now. History
is not only a source of authority but of legitimacy: It reassures us that what we
do now flows continuously out of our past, out of precedents, traditions, fidelity
to statutory and Constitutional texts and meanings.
In drawing upon historical experience for authority and legitimacy, lawyers
address the past in both static and dynamic modes. In the static modes, they
treat the past as existing on a timeless horizontal plane with the present: Past
texts and practices are to be read exactly in their times as they are in ours, or
exactly in our times as in theirs. In the dynamic modes, lawyers recognize
historical change but establish connections between past and present through
stories that integrate them into a reassuring narrative of continuity. In Ameri-
can legal practice, the dynamic modes usually draw upon narratives of recov-
ery, progress ("Whig history"), or teleology. A narrative of recovery, often
accompanied by a jeremiad lamenting recent lapses and corruptions, is one in
which the legal system is seen as ready to be guided to recover the purity of its
original principles. By contrast, a narrative of progress is one in which the
legal system is seen as obeying a long-term process of historical transforma-
tion-e.g. from feudalism to liberal capitalism, status to contract, subordination
to equality. Finally, a teleological narrative is one which shows legal forms
working themselves pure over time to reveal their core of immanent principle.
Some arguments within these conventional legal modes are necessarily
"critical" arguments in the sense that they seek to destroy the authority and
legitimacy of long-standing legal practices, precedents or interpretations.
Think, for example, of the American Revolutionary lawyers' sweeping denun-
ciation of the great bulk of English legal achievement as a corruption of the
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ancient Saxon Constitution by the "canon and feudal law."' For that matter,
think of present-day conservative originalists' condemnation of practically all
Constitutional case law from John Marshall onward as a judicial usurpation of
the powers of majorities. 2 Less dramatically, lawyers speak critically whenever
they argue that some long-standing legal practice, precedent or interpretation
should no longer be followed because changed circumstances or values have
rendered it obsolete. 3 But such critical moves are usually made within the
safety of a larger discourse that reassures us that we are part of a process of
historical becoming that preserves continuity with the good parts of the past
while purging or shedding the bad parts.
So what then is the "critical history," whose arrival in the legal field this
Symposium celebrates? I would say it is any approach to the past that produces
disturbances in the field-that inverts or scrambles familiar narratives of stasis,
recovery or progress; anything that advances rival perspectives (such of those
as the losers rather than the winners) for surveying developments, or that posits
alternative trajectories that might have produced a very different present-in
short any approach that unsettles the familiar strategies that we use to tame the
past in order to normalize the present.
Exposure to critical historicism is like living in another country. Anyone
who lives in a foreign culture can always find ways of doing so that confirm
and reinforce preformed beliefs and identities. In Bangkok, you can stay at the
Hilton and eat only at McDonalds. You can look in the foreign culture for all
the signs that seem to make it identical to one's own-finding "self-interested
rational calculation," or "racism and patriarchy" everywhere. Or you can look
instead for the differences that identify its othemess, the "pre-modem," bar-
baric or alien qualities that your own culture has defined itself in opposition to,
or alternatively has claimed to have safely buried in its discarded past. But
after longer exposure such strategies of self-confirmation tend to wear thin:
seeing that people take utterly for granted things you find exotic, starts to unset-
tle your idea of what it is to be a real, human, ordinary person, and gets you
thinking about contingency and constructed identity-all the influences that
must have gone into the making of the culture that made you.
Virtually all history as practiced by modem historians turns out to be criti-
cal to some degree if introduced into legal discourse, because its purposes and
working assumptions so often conflict with those of lawyers. The essays in this
Symposium, especially those of William Fisher and Jack Rakove, point out
some of these conflicts.4 Lawyers are monists, historians are pluralists-i.e.,
1. See, e.g., 1 John Adams, A Dissertation on the Canon and the Feudal Law, Nos. 1-4, in PAPERS
OF JOHN ADAMs 111, 111-28 (Robert J. Taylor, Mary-Jo Kline & Gregg L. Lint eds., 1977).
2. See, e.g., ROBERT BORK, TrE TEMPTING OF AMERICA: THE POLITICAL SEDUCTION OF THE LAW
20-28 (1990).
3. See, e.g., Brown v. Board of Educ., 347 U.S. 483, 492-93 (1954) (overturning Plessy v. Fergu-
son's interpretation of Fourteenth Amendment that allowed states to establish "separate but equal" edu-
cation for the black and white races obsolete because significance of schooling had changed).
4. See generally William W. Fisher III, Texts and Contexts: The Application of American Legal
History of the Methodologies or Intellectual History, 49 STAN. L. Ry. 1065 (1997); Jack N. Rakove,
Origins of Judicial Review: A Plea for a New Subject, 49 STAN. L. Rav. 1031 (1997).
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lawyers want to recover a single authoritative meaning from a past act or prac-
tice, while historians look for plural, contested, or ambiguous meanings. Law-
yers are overtly presentist: They want to bring past practices into the present to
serve present purposes, whereas historians regard naked presentism as a sin.
"What the historian is interested in is a dead past; a past unlike the present.
The differentia of the historical past lies in its very disparity from what is
contemporary.
' 5
Historians committed to contextualizing past practices will, as Fisher says,
emphasize all the ways in which their meaning depends upon the material con-
ditions, symbolic systems and tacit assumptions in which they were embedded.
For example: "Liberty" in the eighteenth century presupposed a world in
which slaves or indentured or household servants and women would perform
the menial tasks that freed gentleman for participation in politics or the pursuit
of new economic opportunities; a liberty of the few premised on the subordina-
tion of the many. At the same time, "liberty" presupposed more, rather than
less, equality than the present, because of the roughly equal distribution of
property among the politically enfranchised. This republican equality pre-
vented corruption of the weak by the domination of the strong. Finally, "lib-
erty" in that time had no connotations of what was later to come, an abstract
generalized freedom to do as one wills. Instead, "liberty" was distinguished
from "license"; liberty was both subject to and constituted by legal restraints.
6
Lawyers are concerned to find continuities between past and present, while
historians employing what Fisher describes as "contextual" or "structuralist"
approaches will emphasize discontinuous breaks, great epistemic shifts in the
ways in which social actors construct their worlds.
7
Lawyers have a standard and at least initially quite plausible response to
critics who oppose contextualized, pluralized, discontinuous interpretations of
past texts to the lawyers' presentist interpretations: We lawyers are driven by
different purposes than historians; our job is to bring the past into the present
and to turn it to present purposes; this task is no less important and legitimate
than the historian's task, and it necessarily employs different criteria and meth-
ods. A particularly strong form of this argument has recently been made by
John Reid, who is concerned to protect early-modern lawyers from historians'
charges that they "invented" a "fictitious" or "mythic" ancient Saxon Constitu-
tion as the repository of English liberties.8 Reid wants sharply to distinguish
the lawyers' enterprises from those of historians, particularly modem histori-
5. MICHAEL OAKESHOTr, ExPERIENcE AND rrs MODES 106 (photo. reprint 1966) (1933).
6. On eighteenth-century "liberty," see generally EDMUND S. MORGAN, AMRICAN SLAVERY,
AMERICAN FREEDOM: THE ORDEAL IN COLONIAL VIRGINIA 295-387 (1975); JOHN PHILLIP REID, THE
CONCEPrT OF LIBERTY IN THE AGE OF THE AM ICAN REVOLUTION (1988); GORDON WOOD, THE RAD-
CAusM OF THE AMERICAN REVOLUTION (1992).
7. Fisher, supra note 4, at 1067-68 (defining the contextual and structuralist approaches).
8. John Phillip Reid, The Jurisprudence of Liberty: The Ancient Constitution in the Legal Histori-
ography of the Seventeenth and Eighteenth Centuries, in THE RooTs OF LIBERTY: MAGNA CARTA, AN-
CIENT CONSTITUTION, AND THE ANGLO-AMERICAN TRADITION OF RULE OF LAW 147, 158 (Ellis Sandoz
ed., 1993).
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ans; the lawyers, he says, were doing a different kind of history, "forensic"
history for use in legal argument:
The forensic historian... searches the past for material applicable to a current
issue. The purpose of the advocate, unlike that of the historian, is to use the
past for the elucidation of the present, to solve some contemporary problem or,
most often, to carry an argument. It is the past put in the service of winning the
case at bar.
9
Of course at some level Reid's response must be right, or the past could never
be invoked for practical use in contemporary political or legal debate; and it is
almost impossible to imagine political or legal debate without its invocation.
Every legal text is a historical artifact that must be brought into the present in
order to be applied; every time it is applied it must be wrenched from its prior
context and put to novel uses, often uses wholly unsuspected by its framers.
Every important political or legal argument is an argument for either changing,
preserving or recovering something in the past, which in turn relies on a narra-
tive account of what has been and what has (or has not) changed and why. We
often make arguments like this: "Once families stayed (did not stay) together
and fathers took care (did not take care) of children; now as a result of the
countercultural values promoted by courts, the media and new class intellectu-
als (social dislocations and consumerist ethics promoted by capitalism), family
values have (have not) been undermined."
Lawyers find it easiest to invoke this response when their methods or crite-
ria for drawing upon past texts or practices are sharply and formally different
from those of other disciplines-like the English rule that lawyers interpreting
statutes are to look only at the bare words of the text and to shun extrinsic
evidence of context and intent such as legislative debates,10 or the old "plain
meaning" rule excluding evidence of contracting parties' words and acts
outside the "four comers" of the written instrument to interpret the meaning of
their agreements.' 1 Lawyers working under such a formal regime can still ar-
gue about what the words meant, but as Fred Schauer points out, arguments
merely about words take a very different form from context-dependent argu-
ments about purposes or original intentions.12 Problems arise the moment law-
yers transgress such obviously artificial limits on their modes of inquiry, and
start imitating or borrowing from more free-handed modes, such as those of
historians: For example, if they start asking what the takings clause "really
meant" to the generations that conceived of and argued about and framed and
ratified it. At that moment, having expressly adopted the historian's purposes
and methods, having blurred genres and created an overlap between fields, they
leave open a port of entry to the subversive tendencies of-critical history.
9. Id at 167.
10. See JOHN D. CALAMAM & JOSEPH M. PERILLO, THm LAW OF CoNTRAcrs 166-67 (3d ed.
1987).
11. This method still prevails in British Courts. See Charles Nutting, The Relevance of Legislative
Intention Established by Extrinsic Evidence, in 2A Su IR.AND STATUTORY CONSTRUCTION 689, 689
(5th ed. 1991).
12. See FREDERICK SCHAUER, PLAYING BY THE RuLEs: A PHILOSOPHICAL EXAMINATION OF RULE-
BASED DECISION-MAKING IN LAW AND LIFE 218-21 (1991).
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In this Symposium, we can see this process of subversion visibly at work in
Jack Rakove's essay. Rakove modestly disclaims any critical intentions be-
yond those implied in the professional historian's commitment to scrutinize
sources carefully and take a fresh look at received interpretations. 13 But his
essay is potentially very unsettling to the ways in which lawyers habitually see
their world. It opens by suggesting that Marbury v. Madison, the mythic point
of origin for the power of judicial review of legislation, be put in its place as a
trivial point on an extended line with larger landmarks coming well before it.'
4
More important, Rakove's essay argues that, restored to its original context,
federal judicial review is not centrally conceived of as a doctrine of separation
of powers, but one of federalism: that judicial review (by state and federal
courts) was a device adopted to secure federal supremacy over state action and
was only adopted after Madison's preferred device of a Congressional veto had
been voted down in the convention.' 5 The issue posed by judicial review thus
reconceived is not so much a "countermajoritarian difficulty" as modem Con-
stitutional lawyers have seen it,16 but one of determining which level of gov-
ernment to which the People had parceled out their sovereignty should prevail.
Finally, Rakove destabilizes what the usual debates over judicial review take
for granted and hold constant, the meaning of the most basic terms of the de-
bate: "legislature" and "court," institutions he describes as undergoing rapid
evolution. He asks how the judicial role had got to the point where the judici-
ary was a plausible candidate for an institutional control device, instead of just
a presider over and ratifier of jury decisions.17 The essay conveys a perspec-
tive that is found in all of Rakove's work, notably in his magisterial Original
Meanings:'8 that legal texts are contingent, fragile, and ambiguous embodi-
ments of momentary political compromises in a rapid flux of perceptions that
shift with social actors' experiences and fortunes; that no sooner are words
launched upon the world in legal form that they help to set in motion conse-
quences that cause them to be reevaluated and reinterpreted. 19 Once we are
presented with this fluid swirl of multiple, sharply contested and rapidly
refigured meanings, the notion that we can pluck one faction's construct from a
single instant in time, and pronounce it to be for all time, "The Original Mean-
ing" is made to look completely absurd.
But it would be very misleading to leave the impression that the difference
between conventional and critical legal histories is that orthodox lawyers invent
continuities for present purposes, while critical historians make the past discon-
tinuous by contextualizing it. For one thing, historians' practice is of course as
13. See Rakove, supra note 4, at 1031-34.
14. See id. at 1041.
15. See id. at 1046.
16. See Alexander Bickel's famous formulation, Tim LEAST DANGEmOUS BRANCH: Tim SupREME
COURT AT THE BAR OF PoLMcS 16-23 (1962).
17. See Rakove, supra note 4, at 1050-63.
18. JACK N. RAKovE, ORIGINAL NfEAmNGs: POLMCS AND IDEAS IN T-E MAMNG OF T=E CONS'n-
TTION (1996).
19. See generally id.
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present-minded in its own ways as that of lawyers and judges in theirs.20 For
another, more immediately germane to present purposes, orthodox lawyers are
also committed, only more selectively, to establishing discontinuities as well.
One of the main uses of history in legal argument is to relegate the bad parts of
history, the parts we no longer want or need-the past of slavery and legalized
subordination of women, for example-to a thoroughly dead past that is over
and done with. In response to this use of history, a critical historicism reveals
traces of such pasts continuing pervasively into the present. Such a response is
Reva Siegel's article for this Symposium. 21 Siegel describes a kind of legal
regime that aims at "preservation through transformation," a regime that dis-
credits and consigns to the scrap-heap of history older justifications for status
inequality, while inventing new ones. 22 At the end of the nineteenth century,
courts that could no longer justify a husband's beating his wife or appropriating
all the joint earnings of their marriage to himself as incidents of his rights of
mastery over her, argued instead that the legal system could not intervene (to
protect the wife) in the private domain of love and affection.3 Courts deprived
of the rationale for racial subordination that blacks were whites' natural inferi-
ors, fashioned distinctions between "civil," "political," and "social" rights that
left decisions to segregate the races in the social sphere (education, marriage,
association in public places) to the states. In recent times, after the "social
rights" rationale for apartheid has collapsed, the courts have begun to reason
that the evil of race discrimination consists in the state's "discriminatory pur-
pose"--a criterion that makes it hard for plaintiffs to challenge facially-neutral
governmental and social practices that in actual effect help to perpetuate racial
inequality, but (ironically) makes it easy to challenge affirmative-action meas-
ures.24 As courts devise the new rationales, they invent fictional pedigrees for
them in history and tradition by arguing, for example, that the evil of slavery
and segregation lay not in their being systemic social practices that
subordinated the black race, but in their purposely race-based classifications,
violations of the norm of color-blindness. Siegel's essay in critical historicism
demolishes these fictive continuities; but at the same time reveals deeper and
more disturbing continuities---continuing practices of gender and racial subor-
dination, justified by historically familiar and frequently resorted to modes of
nominally reformist legal rhetoric, which justify the traces of the bad past by
inventing new reasons for leaving them undisturbed. Plessy v. Ferguson5 is
not dead but lives on, as the doctrine of discriminatory purpose.
20. Peter Novick provides dramatically concrete and detailed evidence for this truism by showing
how current concerns have influenced the agenda and the interpretations of historians over the course of
the last century. See PEMR NovIcK, TrAT NoBa DRm-M: THE "OBjEcrtvrry" QurEsiON AND THE
AMERICAN HIsTORIcAL. PROESSION (1988).
21. See Reva Seigel, Why Equal Protection No Longer Protects: The Evolving Forms of Status-
Enforcing State Action, 49 STAN. L. Rv. 1111 (1997).
22. Id. at 1113.
23. See id. at 1118.
24. Id. at 1130-31.
25. 163 U.S. 537 (1896).
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The kind of challenge that Rakove's and Siegel's work exemplifies is mul-
tiplied and generalized in the marvelously informative and eye-opening essays
of William Fisher and of Guyora Binder and Robert Weisberg, which together
describe a rich cornucopia, a veritable Whole Earth Catalogue, of novel ap-
proaches to law that are critical in the ways I've been using the term. Most
critical history bearing on law, as Fisher points out, employs the approach of
contextualization. 26 But the authors point to growing bodies of critical work in
other modes as well, among them structuralist, textualist and New Historicist
forms of history and cultural criticism, and provide detailed illustrations of how
they can be and have been applied to produce dramatic reinterpretations of
phenomena in the legal field. What is common to many of these approaches is
that they treat law-meaning not just legal texts but legal instruments,
processes, rituals, interactions, discourses-as cultural artifacts, imaginative
constructs, historically contingent and perpetually contested and renegotiated.
In these modes law becomes "the means by which we continuously refashion
society and one of the media in which we represent and critique what we have
fashioned." 27 The insights of the work that these essays present (some of it the
authors' own) are far too various and intricate for me to try to summarize here.
Let me just say, Read these essays: You will not find anywhere else a more
lucid and powerful account of what may well be the most exciting work cur-
rently being done on law.
26. See Fisher, supra note 4, at 1076.
27. Guyora Binder & Robert Weisberg, Cultural Criticism of Law, 49 STAN. L. REv. 1149, 1219
(1997). "1
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